This paper develops and estimates a model of occupational choice and learning that allows for correlated learning across occupation specific abilities. In the labor market, workers learn about their potential outcomes in all occupations, not just their current occupation. Based on what they learn, workers engage in directed search across occupations. The estimates indicate that sorting occurs in multiple dimensions. Workers discovering a low ability in their current occupation are significantly more likely to move to a new occupation. At the same time, workers discovering a high ability in some occupations are more likely to move up the occupational ladder into managerial occupations. By age 28 this sorting process leads to an aggregate increase in wages similar to what would occur if all workers were endowed with an additional year of education.
Introduction
Models of uncertainty and learning have provided an important framework for studying the rapid occupational mobility and early career wage growth of younger workers. Two notable approaches have been developed in this setting. The first, as illustrated in Miller (1984) , is the occupational matching model whose main emphasis is experimentation. In this model, workers do not know how productive they are in different occupations. They spend the early years of their career searching for their comparative advantage by sorting across occupations. Important to this approach is that occupational productivities are unrelated, so poorly matched workers can always do better by changing occupations, while highly matched workers never change occupations.
1
A second approach, exemplified in Jovanovic and Nyarko (1997) , forms a different view of learning, which characterizes a stepping-stone model of occupational mobility. Under this approach, occupations can be ordered along an occupational ladder. Generally, occupational productivities are assumed to be perfectly correlated, so as learning occurs in entry level occupations, successful performance propels workers to occupations on higher rungs. This view emphasizes vertical mobility from low skill occupations to high skill occupations, where poorly matched workers are likely to stay in entry level jobs and highly productive workers are the most mobile.
2
The goal of this paper is to develop and estimate a model of occupational choice that incorporates these multiple dimensions of learning into a single framework. The model nests both sorting as experimentation (as emphasized by Miller (1984) ) and sorting through promotion (cf. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1997) ) and the relative strength of these effects will be estimated.
In this way, the worker's optimal search strategy becomes an endogenous 1 Empirical work that assumes independence of occupation specific productivities has been conducted in McCall (1990) , Neal (1999) , and Pavan (2009) . Independence of matches is also a typical feature in industrial organization models of experience goods, for example Ackerberg (2003) and Crawford and Shum (2005) .
2 Gibbons et al. (2005) use an IV approach to estimate a model of learning about absolute advantage that resembles this framework. Early work in Shaw (1987) explores these types of mobility patterns using proxies for the transferability of skills across occupations. feature of the model rather than imposed by assumption.
In the model, individual productivity in different occupations is arbitrarily correlated, so information the worker receives about their productivity in one occupation is informative about their productivity in other occupations. Agents learn by choosing their occupations optimally. Thus learning will be multidimensional and the optimal search strategies are complex functions of the unknown parameters of the model and the worker's complete history of information. This more general framework produces a very large state space, which creates well known computational challenges for estimating dynamic discrete choice models. These issues are compounded by the high-dimensional nature of the occupational choice set, imposing significant computational costs.
3
This paper overcomes these computational challenges by implementing a new method for estimating correlated learning models. In addition to being able to tractably estimate these complicated models, this approach has two other advantages. First, it can be carried out with mild assumptions on the learning process. While it is assumed that workers are Bayesian learners, the formation of beliefs is incorporated in a flexible way that does not necessarily require the econometrician to know the exact probability density function in which beliefs are based on. The second benefit of the estimator is that it easily accommodates a large choice set and state space, allowing for a finer level of aggregation of occupations in estimation.
The model is estimated on a subsample of the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth (NLSY97). Two main conclusions are drawn from this analysis. First, for most occupations, by age 28 the conditional mean of ability for those actually employed in that occupation is higher than the unconditional mean. For example, the average Construction ability for those choosing Construction at age 28 is 6% higher than if workers chose occupations randomly, all else equal. In many cases this sorting is significant relative to other factors affecting wages. For example, the change in wages associated with workers sorting into occupations where they have higher ability are comparable to the total increase in wages that would occur if all workers were endowed with an additional year of education.
The second conclusion is that the empirical hazard of choosing an occupation does not always increase monotonically in ability. In many occupations the most productive workers are the most likely to leave these occupations and move to Manager occupations. For example, entry level Construction workers who transition to Manger occupations by age 28 are on average 21% more productive Construction workers and 17% more productive Managers compared to their cohort. On the extreme, some occupations are characterized by negative sorting, where high ability workers are the most likely to change occupations and low ability workers are the most likely to go to these occupations, causing the average ability in these occupations to decrease over time. Food Service and Office and Administrative Support occupations fall into this category for the population studied.
An important implication of the multidimensional selection underlying the data is the direction of the bias that occurs when this selection is not accounted for. The standard interpretation of ability bias is that OLS estimates will overstate the returns to occupational tenure. There is clear evidence of this from a comparison of the estimated returns to occupation tenure from the model with OLS estimates. For Sales occupations, the OLS estimates of the return to Sales experience is 50% higher than the estimates from the model. However, in cases where low ability workers search for new occupations, this produces a negative bias in the across occupation returns to experience. Although these workers will find better matches in other occupations, they will on average be lower ability since past matches are correlated with future matches. This negative selection masks the true transferability of accumulated human capital across occupations. Correctly accounting for this selection implies that skills may be more transferable than previously thought.
A number of recent papers have aimed at estimating correlated learning models in various contexts. The most closely related papers are those by Antonovics and Golan (2011) and Sanders (2010) who estimate occupational choice models in a framework of skill uncertainty. In these models the economy consist of two skills, manual and cognitive, and occupations use these skills at varying rates. These skills are assumed to be independent, but since they are used in all occupations, occupational productivities are correlated.
Following Yamaguchi (2010) they derive the rate of skill use from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to calibrate the occupational productivity correlation matrix. In this paper, the correlation matrix is estimated from the structure of wages. This paper is organized into seven main sections. Section 2 discusses the theoretical correlated learning model. Section 3 details how the model is incorporated into an empirical framework. Section 4 outlines estimation.
Section 5 describes the cohort of the NLSY97 that is used in the analysis and provides descriptive statistics on the occupational choices of these young workers. Section 6 presents the results from estimation, analyzing the role of sorting on ability for mobility patterns observed in the data. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Model
This section outlines the theoretical dynamic learning model. Following the endogenous human capital and occupational choice literature of Keane and Wolpin (1997) , an individual's career is defined as a sequence of discrete choices. In each period, individuals choose among J + 3 mutually exclusive activities, including unemployment (home production), schooling, military, or employment in one of J occupations. The first period corresponds to age 16 and each period t represents a full academic year (September to August).
Let d it = c indicate that agent i makes choice c in period t from the choice set C = {u, s, m, 1, 2, · · · , J}, which follows the ordering above.
If an individual is employed in occupation j, they are paid their occupation specific productivity. Three components contribute to a workers productivity in occupation j: accumulated human capital, innate productivity (ability) in occupation j, and a transitory productivity shock. Human capital is accumulated through education and occupation specific experi-ence. Let s it indicate the individual's highest grade of education completed as of date t and x it (j) be their years of experience in occupation j. The log-wage for worker i in occupation j in period t is defined as:
The returns to education and experience are different for each occupation and are represented by θ s j and θ x j . µ i (j) is the individual's match in occupation j and represents their innate ability, which persists over time.
The J × 1 vector µ i is the individual's complete set of innate productivities for all occupations in the economy. Finally, η is a transitory shock to productivity that is independent over time and normally distributed mean zero with occupation specific variance (i.e. η itj ∼ N (0, σ 2 j )). The fundamental aspect of the agent's occupational choice decision is that in the beginning of their career, they face uncertainty over their vector of innate productivities, µ i . Because this is a persistent component of future wages, workers have an incentive early in their career to discover where their comparative advantage lies. In order to discover this information, workers search across occupations.
It is assumed that workers are only able to acquire information about these matches through direct occupation specific experience. In each period of employment in occupation j, the worker observes his wage. The wage residual, once the part due to education and experience is removed, represents a noisy signal of their innate productivity, µ i (j), denoted by z it (j).
That is, workers cannot separately distinguish between their unknown ability and the technology shock, η, only observing:
Using these signals, workers are Bayesian updaters in the spirit of Miller (1984) and Jovanovic (1979) . Initial beliefs are distributed multivariate normal with individual specific mean γ i and precision matrix ∆, i.e. µ i ∼ N (γ i , ∆) . Given the distribution of the technology shocks, workers know the distribution of the observed signals, z it (j) ∼ N (µ i (j), σ 2 j ). Workers formulate beliefs by applying Bayes' rule to a multivariate normal prior and normally distributed signals. Since the normal distribution is a conjugate distribution, the posterior beliefs will be multivariate normal as well.
Let b it = E t [µ i ] be the worker's expected value of their match vector given information at date t. This is partially determined by x it , their vector of experience, and z it , their average vector of signals defined as:
In the multivariate normal case, Bayes' rule can be written as:
Where ζ(x it , ∆, Σ) is weighting matrix defined as:
This formulation demonstrates two intuitive aspects of the learning process. First, beliefs are formed by the deviation of the average signal form the initial prior. The amount and direction of the revision of beliefs is dictated by the weighting matrix ζ. Second, and more important to the workers' problem, is that even if a worker only has experience in one occupation, this affects their beliefs in all occupations because the off-diagonal elements of ζ are potentially non-zero.
Workers also update the precision of their beliefs. Similar to the mean, the correlation of abilities implies that experience in each occupation will affect the precision of beliefs in other occupations. Unlike the mean, the 4 Σ is J × J diagonal matrix defined as,
precision is only a function of the number of signals not the value of the signals. This covariance matrix is represented by
where:
The optimal search strategy comes about as the solution to a dynamic utility maximization problem, where agents make choices to maximize the expected discounted sum of current and future utility. For each choice in the current period, workers receive a flow of utility, u d it , and if they choose one of the occupations, they receive a signal of their occupation specific productivity, z it (j). Although the signal has no affect on utility in the current period, it has a large impact on future utility through the evolution of beliefs. Workers may trade-off current period utility in exchange for higher expected future utility if the information value of a signal in a particular occupation is high enough.
Let S it = {s it , x it , b it , δ it , X it } contain all exogenous and endogenous elements affecting the worker's decision. All elements are defined above except X it , which represents additional observed factors that influence occupational choices beyond those included in wages, (e.g. choices in previous periods).
The per-period utility function for each choice d ∈ {u, s, m, 1, · · · , J} is defined as:
Where ν d represents a general function defining the mean non-pecuniary aspects of utility for choice d relative to the value of unemployment parameterized by α d . For the employment choices, workers also derive utility from their expected occupation specific wage, which is a function of their beliefs in the current period. Finally, ε is a contemporaneous vector of random utility shocks revealed in period t, but not included in S it .
Beliefs in the model evolve endogenously and stochastically. Conditional on choosing occupation j, the distribution of possible signals is given by the first and second moments of their beliefs, b it and δ it . Because workers are forward looking, they not only consider how their choice affects their information set next period but all future periods as well. Given a discount of future utility β and taking expectations with respect to all possible sequences of beliefs and future utility shocks, the maximal expected discounted present value V is described by,
And V T +1 = 0 for a terminal period T .
With this expression for the value function, the optimal search strategy in the current period is,
Empirical Model
There are two central challenges for incorporating this model into an empirical framework. The first is that according to eq. (4), beliefs are an important factor influencing occupational choices. Since these beliefs are not observed directly, this creates a selection on unobservables problem. The second issue is that including more than a few occupations results in an extremely large state space. This makes it impossible to solve the dynamic programming problem in eq. (3) necessary to form the choice probabilities for estimation.
The empirical strategy for dealing with the selection problem is to form the likelihood of the observed data conditional on beliefs and then integrate over the unobservables. This section is devoted to describing how the workers' dynamic search strategy is modeled in estimation. Rather than explicitly solving for the optimal policy functions, these functions are approximated in a very flexible way and estimated from the data. This section will first describe the likelihood function and then discuss how the reduced form policy functions are identified in this dynamic framework.
The model can be estimated with a panel of data on occupational choices and wage outcomes. For each individual i = 1, 2, . . . , N , we observe two sets of outcomes: their choices, Taking these elements of beliefs as given and making an assumption on the distribution of ε, we can form the choice probabilities as:
The likelihood of the observed choices is:
Uncertainty in the wage equation is driven by the unobserved productivities, µ, and the unobserved technology shock, η. We have assumed that η is normally distributed, so the probability of an observed wage conditional on µ has a closed form expression:
The likelihood of their joint observation of wages is:
With these components, the integrated likelihood of the joint probability of observed choices and wages follows:
Where f (µ|·) is the probability density function over a multivariate normal distribution and dP (γ) is the integration over the distribution of unobserved priors. The assumption that workers have rational expectations has several implications for estimation. Not only is γ the econometric mean of wages, but it is also the worker's initial prior. Similarly, ∆ not only governs the econometric distribution of µ, but it is also essential in how workers form beliefs through ζ.
The rational expectations assumption delivers an important result. Instead of solving the dynamic programming problem in eq. (5), we could approximate these choice probabilities with a reduced form policy function of the observed and unobserved variables if we had consistent estimates of θ, γ, ∆, and Σ. The rational expectations assumption implies that these parameters are identified by other features of the data, specifically the static wage equations. Jointly estimating wages and these policy functions and integrating over the unobservables correctly accounts for dynamic sorting and yields consistent estimates of the policy functions and the other parameters in the model. This quasi-structural approach is similar to Bernal and Keane (2010) .
The quasi-structural approach has the clear advantage in that it does not require the onerous task of solving the dynamic programming problem of this very large state space problem nor impose the requisite assumptions to formulate the dynamic problem. An additional benefit to this approach is that it enables us to also relax some of the previous assumptions over how workers form beliefs. Specifically, rather than parameterize the weight matrix ζ in eq. (2) with ∆ and Σ, we can incorporate the belief updating rules used by the workers non-parametrically. Let ζ j j ,t be a parameter that represents the worker's revision of beliefs about their match in occupation j given t signals of their match in occupation j . Then beliefs can be represented as:
For the policy functions, what matters is how beliefs affect choices. Once we include beliefs into the policy functions, the parameters ζ j j ,t will be absorbed into the parameters of the policy functions. Therefore, instead of including beliefs as the state variables, we can account for their impact on choices by directly including I[x it (j ) = t ](z it (j ) − γ i (j )) for all t ∈ T and all j ∈ J as state variables in the policy functions. Consequently, identification of the policy functions is driven by the rational expectations assumption on γ only and the assumption that the average signal in each occupation is a sufficient statistic in the formation of beliefs. This adds more flexibility to the model where workers can update beliefs in a way that is unknown to the econometrician, but accounted for in estimation.
The policy functions are modeled as a universal logit, with all characteristics entering all choice equations. The variables used in the approximation are defined by X it (θ, γ), where the conditioning on θ and γ indicates that this vector is dependent on other features of the model. These variables are enumerated in Appendix A. The policy functions are defined as:
Where Ω(c|·) ≈ Pr(c|·), unemployment is the omitted choice, and ω are the policy function parameters.
Before discussing estimation, an important result of the productivity wage assumption can be seen in eq. (6). If individuals have homogeneous priors, then the log-likelihood in eq. (6) 
Estimation
To accommodate initial priors, γ i is represented by a finite mixture distribution over K types, with values, γ k . In this way, initial priors are modeled in the same way as unobserved heterogeneity in perfect information models of occupational choice, e.g. Keane and Wolpin (1997) . This level of hetero-5 The likelihood function becomes:
Such a model can be solved using a number of standard methods, either framing the problem as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) (Greene (2002) ) or setting up a state space model and using a Kalman filter (Hamilton (1994) ). One particularly useful application of this result is in problems with high-dimensional choice sets with 100's or 1,000's of choices, where modeling these choices can effectively be ignored or at least estimated independently from the other model parameters.
geneity will have a strong effect on workers' choices as well as their mean wages in all occupations. Since initial priors play an important role in the model, we allow the probability that an individual is type k to be conditional on observed data, g i , with parameters, φ, defined as π k (g i , φ).
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The final log-likelihood for estimation is:
Where Ψ = {φ, γ k , θ, ω, σ, ∆} Although many difficult aspects of the empirical model are circumvented by the quasi-structural approach, the objective function in eq. (7) is still too difficult if not impossible to optimize. The multiple integration and the presence of the wage parameters in the choice equation make it extremely difficult to derive the analytical gradient of the objective function.
8 Because we cannot derive the analytical gradient, we would need to rely on optimizers that either compute numerical approximations to the gradient or are gradient free. Either of these methods are computationally inefficient with more than a few parameters. This is problematic because the model contains 1,350 parameters for the policy functions, 182 wage parameters, and 121 parameters governing the distribution of the unobservables. A secondary issue in estimation is that we want full flexibility in the correlation structure of µ. This means that the off-diagonal elements of ∆ are nonzero, so we must constrain this matrix to be positive-definite, which may be difficult to enforce in any optimization routine.
The model is estimated using the Generalized Expectation and Maximization (GEM) algorithm outlined in James (2012) . This approach overcomes all of the computational challenges associated with this model. First, it does not require the derivation or approximation of the gradient of the original likelihood function and can therefore accommodate an enormous parameter space with little effect on computation time. This is the main result in James (2012), which makes it possible to estimate complicated models of the type presented in this paper. Such models were previously not within reach of empirical researchers. Second, it simplifies the integration by breaking the multidimensional integration into a set of single dimensional integrals, which have simple closed form expressions. Third, it guarantees that the covariance matrix ∆ is positive definite (see. Train (2007)).
Instead of directly optimizing the log-likelihood L(Ψ), the GEM algorithm forms an augmented data likelihood Q(Ψ|Ψ m ), which is a lower bound of the objective function at parameters Ψ m . The crucial characteristic of
. This insight implies that it is possible to find values in the support of Ψ that achieve higher realizations of the likelihood L(·) not by maximizing L(·) directly, which is extremely difficult, but instead by successively maximizing Q(·), which is very simple. The ease of maximizing Q(·) makes the entire algorithm very fast, especially compared to conventional methods that rely on numerically approximating the gradient. The complete algorithm is detailed in Appendix B.
Data Extract and Summary: NLSY97
The model is estimated using the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Based on the responses to the retrospective education and employment questions, each year an individual is assigned to one of 16 mutually exclusive activities: unemployment, schooling, military service, or fulltime employment in one of 13 occupations, which are defined by their 1-digit census occupation classification code in Table 1 . The assignment of activities and the population studied are described in Appendix C. The analysis focuses on the white male subsample, which includes 2,117 individuals with 16,371
person-year observations. (1871) 19 (1746) 20(1611) 21(1490) 22(1379) 23(1294) 24(1127) 25 (808) 26 (536) 27 (298) 28(95).
number of observations at each age for this cohort. As expected, labor market attachment is weak for these young workers with about 20% neither in school or working fulltime. The share of employment is not even across the 13 occupations. In particular very few individuals in their early 20's work in any of the Manager, Business, or Professional occupations, however by their late 20's these represent about 25% of those employed. Table 3 provides details on the link between education and occupation.
The first column shows the average year of education completed for all observations of workers in these occupations for this cohort. This ranges from a low of 11.6 years for Construction occupations to a high of 15.7 years for Business and Financial Services occupations. Of the occupations traditionally grouped as high skill (Manager, Business, and Professional occupations),
Manger occupations have the lowest mean education level, with on average one year less than the other three high skill occupations.
The remaining columns in Table 3 show the share of entry level occupations as well as the share of individuals who have ever worked in each occupation (conditional on entering the labor market) as of age 28 for those with at most a high school degree, those with some college, and those with a college degree or more. For high school graduates, 75% of their entry level jobs are represented by five of the 13 occupation categories, including Construction, Transportation, Food Service, Production, and Sales. Virtually none begin their career in high skill occupations. The next column shows the fraction of these workers who ever work in each occupation. Notably, more than one-third of these workers spend time in Construction occupations. Also, about 6% gain experience as a Manager, the most likely high skill occupation for these workers.
Turning to the occupation experiences of those with a college degree, more than half begin their career in either Manager, Business, or Professional occupations. Also, almost 25% will have some Sales experience by the age of 28. Finally, the patterns of those with some college are a mix between high school graduates and college graduates. However, this group is more likely to hold initial occupations in Food, Sales, and Office compared to the other education groups.
Results
The goal of this paper is to investigate the importance of ability sorting for observed occupational choices and wages. The results section is divided into three parts. First we begin with the estimates for the distributional parameters of unobserved abilities µ. Then we move toward studying the role of sorting on these unobserved variables for career outcomes. Finally, we compare the estimates of the wage parameters from the model to OLS estimates in order to study the bias that arises when we do not control for the selection generated by the correlated learning framework. The parameter estimates not reported in the main body of the paper are presented in Appendix D.
Distribution of Abilities
The distribution of abilities, µ i , is characterized by the individual specific The remaining sections of Table 4 show the estimated residual distribution of abilities across the 13 occupations after controlling for initial priors.
The second row reports the standard deviation of innate productivity in each occupation and the bottom section reports the correlation structure.
The standard deviation of ability refers to the unconditional distribution of ability in these occupations in the population, not the conditional distribution of ability for those that select into these occupations. The variance of occupation specific abilities is large, even after controlling for the initial level of heterogeneity. If workers have rational expectations, their 95% confidence interval of their uncertainty for their Manager ability (for example) is that their productivity will be either 57% lower than they initially expected, or 57% higher than they expected. Put another way, in the population the top mangers are 57% more productive than the average manager, while the least productive would be 57% less productive than average. These variances dif- Significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Not Reported for estimates of standard deviation of ability. Constructed from 800 non-parametric bootstraps of the model.
priors. As individuals learn they are more (less) productive than they initially expected in one occupation, they will likely infer that they are better (worse) at all things than initially expected.
While occupation abilities are very correlated, important differences appear. One example is among the three service occupations, which by census definitions should all be very related. This is true between the SERV1 and SERV2 category, where the correlation coefficient is one of the highest in the 
Learning and Occupational Sorting
We now turn to examining the extent to which workers sort on occupation specific productivities and the extent to which this sorting is effected by the fact that abilities are correlated. The main tool for this analysis is the estimated policy functions and the primitives of the underlying ability distribution. Given these values, we can regenerate the data and study workers' responses to new information over their careers'. The focus is on sorting relative to initial expectations, measured as µ i (j)−γ i (j). 9 Since these variables relate to the individual specific constant in the log-wage equation, the value of this measure has a very clear interpretation as a percent change in wages.
To begin the analysis, we first examine the empirical hazard of workers choosing an occupation conditional on their ability. The upper plot of Figure 1 shows the average probability of working in Construction at age 28 for high school graduates whose entry occupation was Construction as a function of their Construction ability differenced by their initial prior. The bottom plot preforms a similar analysis for college graduates and Sales occupation. According to Table 3 , both of these occupations represent important entry occupations for the respective education levels.
9 Sorting on initial priors is not studied in this paper. In some ways this type of sorting resembles that of the perfect information model of Keane and Wolpin (1997) , which is not surprising since this form of unobservable is modeled in a very similar way.
For both of these occupations, Figure 1 confirms our main intuition, that those who are less capable in their entry occupation are less likely and those that are more capable are more likely to continue working in their entry occupation. High school graduates beginning their career in Construction who are 40% less productive than average (about -1.5 standard deviations below the mean) have only a 25% probability of choosing Construction at age 28. By contrast, the mean probability of choosing Construction at age 28 is more than 60% for workers whose Construction ability is +1.5 standard deviations above average.
However, for both of these occupations, the hazard rate plateaus for high ability workers and even begins to decline for very high ability workers. This underscores the complicated selection problem generated by the correlated learning structure. In concordance with the matching model, low ability workers are likely to leave these occupations in pursuit of better matches in other occupations. On the other hand, high ability workers may become mobile as well, since the correlation structure may increase the value of their other employment options.
To show the effects of this sorting for Construction, the top section of Figure 2 plots the conditional distribution for high school graduates that select into Construction at three points in time. The solid line plots the unconditional distribution of abilities in Construction, which is representative of workers choosing occupations randomly or the initial sorting into Construction.
10 The dashed line plots the distribution of abilities for those that choose Construction at age 21, and the dash-dot line plots the distribution for those that select Construction at age 28. This plot provides strong evidence that workers are selecting positively on ability in Construction as the probability mass moves up and to the right with age. 11 This means that these workers are becoming on average higher ability and more concentrated around higher ability over time. The vertical dash-dot line shows the average ability in construction at age 28 for high school graduates. For Construction, wages are on average 6% higher due to this positive sorting compared to a world where workers choose occupations randomly and we hold fix the distribution of accumulated human capital.
The sorting patterns in Construction are illustrative of occupations that exhibit positive sorting. An important implication of the correlated learning framework is that not all occupations will experience positive sorting.
In fact, in some occupations we may observe negative sorting, where high ability workers are the most likely to leave these occupations and the average ability decreases over time. An example of average negative selection occurs for high school graduates that select into Food Service occupations. Looking only at the average effect of sorting may mask some important patterns in the data. For example, the average ability in Construction at age 28 for high school graduates is 0.06. This is composed of individuals who choose Construction and discover they have high ability and stay, those that discover low ability and leave, others who may have begun their career Dist. employed age 28 Mean employed at age 28 
in Transportation, discovered a low match, and subsequently moved to Construction, etc. Tables 6 decomposes these Transportation of poorly matched workers. This phenomenon is a byproduct of the correlation of abilities. As low ability workers seek out better matches by changing occupations, they will likely find on average lower, but better matches in other occupations. This is apparent in looking at the 11% of transportation workers who began their career in Construction. These workers are on average 20% less productive in Construction than the other workers whose entry occupation was Construction. The estimated correlation coefficient between Construction and Transportation is 0.5, meaning that these workers will likely have lower Transportation ability as well. This is clearly true as their average transportation ability is -0.05, which drags down the total average. A different measure of sorting that could apply to these workers is the 15% increase in wages they experience (holding other things fixed) by avoiding Construction.
The middle section of Table 6 decomposes the average ability for those working in Office and Administrative Support occupations, which had a negative value. The influx of low ability workers is the primary factor driving down the average sorting on ability observed for this occupation. Those who began their career in Office and choose Office at age 28 show no positive sorting on ability. However, low ability workers from Sales, Construction, Maintenance, and Production bring down the average over time. Importantly though, each of these workers finds a better match than their entry occupation.
There is strong evidence that workers sort into occupations where they discover that they are high ability. We are also interested in the degree that workers discovering a high ability in one occupation may use this information to sort into other occupations. The important occupation for this analysis is Manager occupations. Virtually no high school graduate begins their career as a Manager, yet 4% are in these occupations by age 28. The bottom section of Table 6 shows the career patterns for these high school graduates who are working in Manager occupations at age 28. Manager occupations show the largest level of ability sorting. This is extremely suggestive of the stepping-stone type mobility in Jovanovic and Nyarko (1997) .
The two largest values are for Sales occupations and Construction occupations. Construction workers that become Managers are on average 21% more productive Construction workers than the average worker beginning in Construction. Because of the correlation they are also 17% more productive Managers. Positive sorting on Manager ability is less important in other occupations, for example Transportation.
To conclude the analysis on sorting, Table 7 summarizes the aggregate effect of sorting for all individuals in the population. The analysis divides workers into two groups: those who discover they have higher ability and those who discover they have lower ability than initially expected in their 
entry occupation. Each group is equally represented by definition. Each group is further broken down by those who are unemployed at age 28, those working in their entry occupation at age 28, and those working in an occupation different from their entry occupation at age 28.
The first column shows the share of each segment of the population as a percent of the total population. Those with above average ability in their entry occupation are 33% more likely to remain in their entry occupation than those discovering they are below average ability in their entry occupation. These two groups move to new occupations at the same rate, but those discovering low ability in their entry occupation are more likely to be unemployed at age 28.
For each segment of the population, the remaining columns show the average ability in their entry occupation, their average ability in their age 28 occupation, and the difference. The bottom row reports the total. By construction, the average ability of entry occupation is zero, since no workers have any information to sort on. By age 28, the average ability increases to almost 3%. From the earlier analysis, this number is the average of all occupations, with some having a 6% increase, others having a 3% increase, and some having negative values.
Using the entry match as a baseline, we can compare the match for the occupations workers choose at age 28. For workers with above average productivity in their entry occupation, they have above average productivity in their age 28 occupation, either from staying in their entry occupation or moving to a new occupation. Those changing occupations on average have lower, but still positive, ability in their new occupation. This was seen in both Construction workers and Sales workers moving to Manger occupations, where each group had high entry abilities than Manager abilities.
Workers with a below average ability in their entry occupation continue to have below average ability in their age 28 occupation on average. However, the workers who change occupations move to occupations where they are substantially more productive, a difference of 12%. These workers sorting into occupations where they have higher, but still negative, abilities are one of the main drivers of the increase in average ability in the population.
Selection Bias
The correlated learning framework generates a very interesting selection problem. For most occupations there is strong evidence that workers sort positively on ability. Failing to account for this selection will produce an upward bias in the returns to experience in these occupations. However, as low ability workers try new occupations, the correlation implies they will on average be lower ability in other occupations. Failing to account for this selection may downward bias the estimates of the across occupational returns to accumulated human capital, understating the transferability of accumulated skills across occupations.
This section studies the bias in the OLS estimates when we do not control for selection. What makes this analysis challenging is that a bias in one parameter biases all of the parameters. To address this, we compute the theoretical bias which would occur if consistent estimates of all of the This analysis uses the model estimates to simulate choices and wages for high school graduates with Type 1 priors and computes the theoretical bias taking all of the other parameters as given. ***,**,* Significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Constructed from 800 non-parametric bootstraps of the model. & Significantly different from zero at 15% level.
parameters were available except the parameter of interest. In this case the bias in the return to experience in occupation j for wages in occupation j is defined as cov(x it (j ), µ i (j)|d it = j)/var(x it (j )|d it = j). In addition, to abstract from sorting by education and type, we also condition this analysis on high school graduates with Type 1 priors. Table 8 shows the bias in the estimated return to accumulated human capital for the seven most common occupations for high school graduates.
As expected, most of the own occupation specific returns (the diagonal elements) are significantly biased upward as workers sort positively on ability.
The two exceptions are Food Service and Office and Administrative support, which showed little sorting in the earlier analysis. The bias appears most significant for Sales, Construction, and Transportation. Tables 5 shows the estimated own experience return for these occupations from the model. The bias is largest in Sales of close to 50%. For Transportation the bias is 35% and almost 20% for Construction.
Looking at the bias in the across occupational returns to experience (the off-diagonal elements), for many occupations, the selection produces a downward bias. Of the 42 across occupation experience returns reported, 31 have a negative bias, with 10 being statistically significant. One of the largest and most significant is the return for Construction experience in
Transportation, where Table 6 demonstrated that low ability Construction workers were likely to sort into Transportation.
Conclusion
This paper develops and estimates a multidimensional correlated learning model to study early career wage growth and occupational choices. By allowing occupation specific productivities to be flexibly correlated, the model facilitates both sorting through experimentation, described in Miller (1984) , where workers discovering low ability in an occupation are likely to try new occupations in pursuit of a better match, and sorting through promotion, described in Jovanovic and Nyarko (1997) , where workers discovering high ability in an occupation become more likely to be move to new occupations because of their high performance in their first occupation.
The correlated learning approach produces an extremely challenging selection problem as the worker's optimal search strategy is a complicated function of the unknown model parameters. Previous work has avoided this selection problem by imposing assumptions on the correlation structure, either assuming occupation specific productivities are completely independent or perfectly correlated, which imply the optimal search strategy to be imposed in estimation. In this paper, the underlying correlation structure of occupation specific productivity is a key parameter of interest, and the optimal search strategy is an endogenous feature of the model. The methodological approach used in this paper can be advantageously extended to the broader class of learning models where continuous outcomes are observed along with choices. For example, major choice and grades, pharmaceutical demand when data is available on side-effects, or health choices when measures of health are observed.
The model is estimated on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997. On average, sorting on ability has a positive and strong effect on wages. By age 28, the average increase in wages due to sorting on ability is approximately equal to the average increase in wages that would occur if all workers were endowed with an additional year of education. The results provide strong evidence that sorting occurs in multiple dimensions. Workers who discover a low ability in their current occupation are very likely to try new occupations. In most cases these workers find higher matches. On the other hand, while workers that discover they are high ability in an occupation are more likely to stay, they also become more likely to move to high skill occupations like Manager. A Conditional Choice Probabilities 
Total Each Equation 90 
B Details of Estimation
The quasi-structural model is estimated using a Generalized Expectation and Maximization (GEM) algorithm outlined in James (2012) . The GEM algorithm is a modified EM algorithm that uses a simple step to update the choice parameters rather than the full M-step of the EM algorithm. Rather that directly maximizing eq. (7), the GEM algorithm instead iteratively maximizes an augmented data likelihood Ψ m+1 = argmax Ψ Q(Ψ|Ψ m ), which takes as input the previous iterations estimates Ψ m . Letting f (·|ξ, Υ) denote the cdf of a multivariate normal with mean ξ and covariance Υ. The augmented data likelihood takes the form:
The augmented data likelihood differs from the original likelihood in two ways. First it includes two additional elements, q These can be interpreted as probability density functions of the unobserved variables γ i and µ conditional on the individual's data and the current parameter estimates. q is a discrete probability of the unobserved prior, and f is a multivariate normal distribution of unobserved ability, µ. For now we will take these as given and discuss the maximization of eq. (8). Later we will return to the derivation of these densities.
The second difference in the augmented data likelihood and the original likelihood is that the log function is inside of the integration. This is an extremely desirable property of the EM algorithm discussed in Arcidiacono and Jones (2003), which implies additive separability of many of the parameters and allows us to maximize the parameters independently.
The maximization of each parameter has a closed form expression, so the algorithm is extremely fast. The update of each parameter is discussed below.
Update φ: Parameters for initial conditions. φ enters eq. (8) as:
This represents a weighted logit, whose maximization does not have a closed form solution. The GEM algorithm in James (2012) shows that we can update the parameters by computing one modified Newton-Raphson step.
Update ω: Parameters for policy functions. ω enters eq. (8) as:
Where
This represents a weighted logit, so we apply the same lower bound result as the initial condition parameter. Since this is a multivariate logit, the parameters must be appropriately vectorized but has the general form
See James (2012) (2003) show that while less efficient, we can obtain consistent estimates of the parameters by maximizing over only part of the likelihood. Ignoring that γ k enters the choices we have:
This has a closed form solution as:
Update ∆: Covariance of abilities. ∆ enters eq. (8) as:
This has a closed form solution as,
Update θ j : Wage parameters for occupation j independently for each occupation. θ j enters eq. (8) 
This is a weighted least squares problem with a closed form solution
Update σ j : Variance of technology shock independently for each occupation j. σ j enters eq. (8) as:
The maximizations take as input q 
C NLSY97 Activity Assignment and Sample Selection Assignment of activities was done sequentially beginning with education.
Schooling The schooling assignment was based on reported attendance and did not require them to actually complete the grade. This is consis-tent with a general model where individual's make education choices with uncertain outcomes. Since the quasi-structural model only estimates policy functions conditional on state variables, we are not required to make assumptions on the how agents form expectations over outcomes. For primary and secondary education, the individual was coded as attending school if they reported attending any grade at all. The NLSY97 provides a monthly postsecondary education enrollment indicator. In general it does not appear that this variable is informative about actual attendance as the mode number of months of attendance for those with positive attendance is 12 months. For those pursuing postsecondary education below an advanced degree, a monthly term variable was collected. This variable appears much more reliable as most individuals report no term over the summer months. Therefore, these individuals where assigned to schooling if they reported attending college and provided a valid term for at least 6 out of 12 months. Schooling was not assigned to those that did not have a valid term. However, for these individuals, if it was apparent that they were not enlisted in the military and not employed fulltime, then they were recoded as attending school.
Term information was not collected for those attending graduate school, so the monthly attendance variable was the sole criteria. If information is not available for the entire year, for example in their last interview round, then the information in available months was converted to a 12 month equivalent and the same criteria applied.
Employment If the respondent did not meet the school enrollment criteria and reported working at least 1,400 labor hours for the year, then the individual was assigned to employment. Again, if the individual was not present for the entire year, the weeks observed where converted to an annual equivalent. If the individual worked multiple full-time jobs, then the attributes of the job with the most fulltime weeks was assigned for that year. For each job, the respondent identifies the 3-digit 2002 Census occupation code. Given the reported 3-digit occupation, the individual is assigned to one of the 13 occupation categories following table 1.
12 Finally, wages are 12 Previous papers modeling career decisions, (e.g. Neal (1999); Pavan (2009) ; Kambourov and Manovskii (2009)) using the NLSY79 or Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data have documented the high potential for measurement error when the reported occupation code is taken directly from the data. To avoid counting false career changes these papers impose a number of edits on the occupational data. The primary edit is to not consider any occupational change unless it is accompanied by a change in employer. Yamaguchi (2010) points out that this may be an undesirable restriction on assigned using the hourly compensation rate of pay, which includes all forms of monetary compensation affiliated with the job and is deflated using the consumer price index to year 2008 dollars.
Military If an individual reported active military service for 25 or more weeks in a year their activity was coded as military.
Unemployment Finally, if they did not meet any of the assignment criteria, they were assigned to unemployed.
The analysis focuses on the white male cross-sectional sample from the data. This group consists of 2,284 individuals. The discrete decision period corresponds to the school year (September to August). The decisions of individuals are continually tracked from age 16 (t=1) until round 12. Of the original population, 2,138 remain in the survey until at least age 16. If the gap between interview dates for any individual exceeds 16 months, then the remaining observations for that individual are dropped from the analysis.
13
This leaves 17,616 person-years for the analysis.
Finally, an individual's remaining observations where dropped if any one of three events occurred: 1) their highest grade completed or degree completed is invalid from the survey data, 2) the individual's primary activity was employment, but no occupation was reported or the reported wage was greater than $100 per hour or less than $5 per hour 14 , or 3) reported comthe data as it is likely to exclude important career changes as individuals are promoted within the firm. The NLYS97 is unique from the NLSY79 and PSID in that it likely does not suffer from systematic measurement error in the reported occupation. From the beginning, the NLSY97 was conducted with a computer-assisted interview system which allows interviewers to reference back to the responses of their previous years interview. Interviewees are first read their previous years job description and are asked if that continues to define their job function. The occupation code only changes if they report a change in duties. Pavan (2009) , using the NLSY79 data, cites evidence of spurious reported occupation changes by the fact that 40% of individuals remaining with the same employer in consecutive periods report a change in 3-digit occupations. The analogous figure for the NLSY97 data at the 3-digit detail level is only 13% of workers. This is a reasonable figure representing mobility within firms. The fact that this number is not overstated provides reasonable assurance of the reliability of the observed occupation changes. This feature makes the NLSY97 particularly desirable for a model that looks at a finer level of occupational choice. 13 The exception is for interviews conducted in 1997. In many cases the gap between the round 1 and round 2 interview exceeded 18 months.
14 In 2008 real dollars.
pleting 20 or more years of education. 15 These filters affected 7% of the records, leaving 2,117 individuals and 16,371 person-years for the analysis, averaging 7.66 years per individual. 15 There appear to be a large fraction of medical students who meet the employment criteria with 20 years of education. Mean wages increase monotonically across education levels except for 19 years to 20 years where the average wage falls 28%. These outliers have a strong effect on the returns to education, so these 20 observations are dropped. Significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively, constructed from 800 non-parametric bootstraps of the model.
D Parameter Estimates
Not Identified. No workers with this experience in this occupation.
